In this paper, we investigate whether intellectual capital (IC) and financial disclosures jointly affect the firm's cost of equity capital. In contrast to prior research, we disaggregate disclosures into IC and financial disclosures and examine whether the two disclosure types are jointly related to the cost of equity capital. We also investigate whether IC and financial disclosures have an interaction effect on the cost of equity capital. Using data for a sample of 125 UK firms, we find a negative relationship between the cost of equity capital and IC disclosure. We find that the relationship between financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital is magnified when combined with IC disclosure. Additionally, we find that IC and financial disclosures interact in shaping their effects on the cost of equity capital. Further analyses suggest that the effect of financial disclosure on the cost of equity capital is augmented for firms characterised by a medium level of IC disclosure. These results provide important insights into the relationship between disclosures and cost of equity capital and have policy and practical implications.
Introduction
This study examines the economic consequences of disclosure on a sample of UK listed firms.
Specifically, we disaggregate annual report disclosures into intellectual capital (IC) and financial disclosures and investigate whether the two disclosure types are jointly related to the cost of equity capital. 1 We further analyse whether IC and financial disclosures interact in their effects on the cost of equity capital. Theoretically, disclosure reduces the cost of capital through either a reduction in estimation risk on the investor's part (see Easley and O'Hara, 2004) or transactions costs resulting from lower information asymmetry (see Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007) . Several empirical studies apply these theoretical perspectives to examine the relationship between disclosure and cost of capital. In an extensive review of such studies, Healy and Palepu (2001) and Botosan (2006) conclude that the evidence on the link is mixed. 2 More strikingly, Botosan's (2006) review also points to different disclosure types affecting the cost of capital in different ways. In this context, the authors call for further research to help us understand the cost of capital effects of disclosure. In this paper, we respond to these calls by examining the IC disclosure effects on the cost of equity capital.
We depend on prior literature for most of the ideas underlying our study (see section 2 for details of the literature). In summary, the prior literature points to firms' heavy investments in IC assets 3 in today's knowledge-based economy, and notes the investors' growing demand for information about these IC assets in the process of valuing shares (Lev, 2001; Holland, 2003) . This demand for IC information is underpinned by the notion that IC assets are an integral part of the firm's value-creating processes (Holland, 2003) and are important for creating and maintaining 1 IC is defined by CIMA (2001, p. 2) as "…the possession of knowledge and experience, professional knowledge and skill, good relationships, and technological capacities, which when applied will give organisations competitive advantage." It comprises three major categories: human capital, structural capital and relational capital (Guthrie, Petty and Ricceri, 2007; Beattie and Thomson, 2007) . 2 For example, some studies document a negative relationship between the cost of capital and aggregate disclosure (e.g., Hail, 2002; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Francis, Khurana and Pereira, 2005) , timely disclosure (e.g., Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005) , whilst others show a positive relationship with timely disclosures (quarterly reports) (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee, 2002) and social disclosures (e.g., Richardson and Welker, 2001 ), yet others show a negative relationship with financial disclosure, but only for firms with low analyst following (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Richardson and Welker, 2001) . 3 Such IC assets include research and development, brand development, franchises, customer-base creation, advertising, human capital and corporate image.
competitive advantage (Keller, 2002) , and contributing to superior performance (Walsh et al., 2009 ).
The literature (e.g., Holland, 2003) also argues that IC assets combine and interact with physical and financial assets to create firm value in unique ways. In this context, there are studies demonstrating that information about IC assets helps the investor to (1) improve their interpretation of the financial results (Luft and Shields, 2001 ) and (2) better understand the future cash flow generating capabilities of the firm (Amir and Lev, 1996) . To the extent that IC assets create value in the firm, and that the information about IC assets is important to investors, we expect greater IC disclosure to lower the cost of equity capital.
We employ a sample of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and estimate the firm's cost of equity capital using the modified price-earnings growth (PEG) model (Easton, 2004) .
Our proxy for the two disclosure measures is a coded index of IC and financial information from firms' annual reports. We find that IC disclosure is negatively related to the cost of equity capital. We also find that the relationship between financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital is magnified when combined with IC disclosure. Additionally, we observe that IC and financial disclosures interact on their effects on the cost of equity capital. An analysis of this interaction demonstrates that the effect of financial disclosure on the cost of equity capital is augmented for firms characterised by a medium level of IC disclosure. These results are robust to alternative estimates of the cost of equity capital. 4 Our results are new, and demonstrate the importance of disaggregating disclosure into IC and financial information in understanding the disclosure-cost of capital relationship.
We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, we disaggregate annual report disclosure into IC and financial disclosures to understand whether they individually and jointly influence the cost of equity capital. Prior studies have examined aggregate disclosures (see Francis, Khurana and Pereira, 2005; Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007) . The focus on aggregate disclosure means that the impact of different disclosure types on the cost of capital is not well understood.
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Second, by examining both IC and financial disclosures in a single study, we address the problem of omitted variables suffered by studies examining a specific (single) disclosure type (e.g., Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005) . As Amir and Lev (1996, p.4) argue, the focus on aggregate disclosure or a single disclosure type is "...restrictive and may lead to unwarranted conclusions". Third, our study offers a significant development to three studies examining IC disclosure and the cost of capital (Singh and Van der Zahn, 2007; Kristandl and Bontis, 2007; Orens, Aerts and Lybaert, 2009 Kristandl and Bontis (2007) , we model both IC and financial disclosures in our analyses, and extend their study by investigating whether the disclosure measures interact to affect the cost of equity capital.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of literature and formulates the hypotheses. In section 3, we specify our model, and describe how we developed the cost of equity capital and disclosure measures. In section 4, we describe the sample selection procedure and provide the descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the empirical results of the study and reports on additional analyses. Finally, section 6 offers some concluding remarks to the study. 5 For example, consider two firms. Firm A discloses 60% IC and 40% financial information, and firm B discloses 40% IC and 60% financial information. Assuming equal weighting, each firm's average aggregate disclosure score would be about 50%. Let us say firm A's cost of capital is 10% and B's is 15%. In this scenario, if we model with aggregate disclosure, there will be no relationship between disclosure and the cost of capital. However, modelling with individual disclosure types is likely to result in disclosure variations and a better understanding how these affect the cost of capital.
Literature review and hypotheses

Prior literature
The notion that disclosure affects the cost of capital is driven by two streams of theoretical literature (see Healy and Palepu, 2001 for a review). One stream argues that information asymmetry introduces adverse selection into transactions between buyers and sellers (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) . This reduces market liquidity in the firm's shares and, therefore, firms will be forced to issue shares at a discount because investors pay less for shares with high transaction costs (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Welker, 1995) . Firms can lower the discount at which their shares are issued by improving disclosure (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) because enhanced disclosure reduces the incentives by investors to acquire costly private information (Welker, 1995) . The second stream posits that greater disclosure results in a reduction of the estimation risk associated with the share's return. A reduction in estimation risk lowers investors' required rate of return (Coles, Loewenstein and Suay, 1995; Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007) . Thus, from a theoretical perspective, the consensus is that there is a negative relationship between disclosure and the cost of capital.
Whilst there is theoretical consensus, the empirical literature on the relationship is mixed, and most importantly for our study, suggests that the relationship between disclosure and the cost of capital depends on the type of disclosure (see Botosan, 2006) . Botosan (1997) and Richardson and Welker (2001) document a negative relationship between the cost of capital and financial disclosure, but only for firms with low (but not high) analyst following. In their study, Richardson and Welker (2001) also examine social disclosure and find a positive relationship with social disclosure. In a study similar to Botosan (1997 ), Hail (2002 finds a negative relationship between voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital for a sample of Swiss firms. Botosan and Plumlee (2002) document that the cost of capital decreases with increased annual report disclosures, but increases with quarterly report disclosure. In the UK, Gietzmann and Ireland (2005) (Fama and French, 2004) . Kristandl and Bontis (2007) examine firms in four European countries and find a negative relationship between the cost of capital and forward-looking disclosures, and a positive relationship with financial disclosures. However, for their cost of capital, they use the Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) model which is criticised for producing estimates that fail to efficiently relate to risk factors (see Botosan, 2006) . Orens, Aerts and Lybaert (2009) use web-based IC disclosures and find a negative relationship with the cost of capital, but they do not examine whether financial and IC disclosures are jointly and interactively related to the cost of equity capital.
Hypotheses
We draw from the theoretical and empirical research to develop our hypotheses. As argued in prior literature, investments in IC assets are critical for firm value creation (see Pike, Rylander and Roos, 2002; Holland, 2003; and creating and sustaining superior performance (see Holland, 2006; Walsh et al., 2009; Hsu and Wang, 2012) . Keller (2002) (Amir and Lev, 1996) , software development costs (Aboody and Lev, 1998 ) and customer satisfaction (Ittner and Larcker, 1998) have an impact on share prices.
The problem, however, is that under existing Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), investments in IC assets are either immediately expensed in the financial statements or arbitrarily amortised and therefore are not fully reflected in the financial statements (Amir and Lev, 1996; Lev, 2001) . This means that whilst investors are informed about financial assets, information asymmetry still exists because investors are not fully informed about the productivity of the investment in IC assets (Barth, Kasznik and McNichols, 2001; Holland, 2003) . As Aboody and Lev (2000) argue, the information asymmetry is more acute for investments in IC than for investments in physical and financial assets because IC is unique to specific firms. The problem is compounded by the absence of regulatory requirements to disclose IC information. Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001) argue that lack of information about IC investments complicates the task of equity valuation by investors and may affect their ability to anticipate the rewards of investments in IC assets and, therefore under-price the firm's shares. In this respect, greater disclosure of IC information improves investors' understanding of the productivity and value changes of IC assets (Beattie and Thomson, 2007; Guthrie, Petty and Ricceri, 2007) and the economic risks attached to the firm's future cash flows (Coles, Loewenstein and Suay, 1995) . This should lead to improvement in capital market efficiency, which reduces the uncertainty premium required by investors when making decisions to invest in a firm (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Easley and O'Hara, 2004) . Thus, from a theoretical perspective, improving IC disclosure reduces information asymmetry (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) , lowers estimation risk (Coles, Loewenstein and Suay, 1995) and reduces the cost of capital.
Pike, Rylander and Roos (2002), Nagar and Rajan (2001) and Holland (2006) argue that IC assets combine and interact with physical and financial assets in unique ways to create firm value. In this context, investors would also gain additional insights by integrating IC and financial information in making decisions. Indeed as Amir and Lev (1996) 
Research methods
The empirical model
Following previous work (e.g., Botosan, Plumlee and Xie, 2004; Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005; Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007) , we estimate the following regression model:
Where is the implied cost of equity capital for the firm, measured using the modified price earnings growth (PEG) model (see section 3.2). RFDI and RICDI represent the ranks of financial and IC disclosure indexes, respectively, both measured as discussed in section 3.3 below. RFDI*RICDI is the interaction term computed as the product of the ranks of FDI and ICDI (see also, Botosan, Plumlee and Xie, 2004; Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007; Muino and Trombetta, 2009 ). Although our main variables are disclosure and the cost of equity capital, consistent with prior studies, our model also controls for natural log of firm size (LnSIZE), market risk (BETA), financial leverage (LEV) and natural log of book-to-market ratio (LnB2M) to control for known risk factors (see Easton, 2004) . 6 Consistent with prior literature (Botosan, 1997; Francis, Khurana and Pereira, 2005) , we expect firm size to be negatively related to the cost of equity capital. Our size variable (LnSize) is measured as the firm's natural log of market capitalisation at the financial year end. We also expect market risk (Hail, 2002; Botosan, Plumlee and Xie, 2004) , financial leverage (Botosan, 1997; Easton, 2004) and book-to-market ratio (Botosan, Plumlee and Xie, 2004; Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005) to be positively associated with the cost of equity capital. We measure financial leverage as the total liabilities scaled by the market capitalisation at the year-end (see Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005; Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007) . The book-to-market ratio is computed by scaling the book value of the firm's equity by the market capitalisation (Botosan, Plumlee and Xie, 2004) , both measured at the financial year end. Following recent literature demonstrating a link between corporate social responsibility and the cost of capital (e.g., Guenster et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Cheah et al., 2011) , we also control for firm's accountability reputation (ACCOREPUT). We measure ACCOREPUT as a dummy taking the value of 1 if the firm is included in the FTSE4Good Index, 0 otherwise. 
Cost of equity capital proxy
The literature has developed valuation models to estimate the cost of capital implied by mean analyst earnings forecasts and current share prices. The main valuation models are the residual income valuation (RIV) model (Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 2001) , the abnormal earnings growth (AEG) model (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005; Gode and Mohanram, 2003) and the modified price-earnings growth (PEG) model (Easton, 2004) . We employ the PEG model for three reasons.
First, Cooper (2006) argues that in studying the disclosure-cost of capital relationship, it is not the accuracy of the absolute measure of the cost of capital that matters, but the relative differences in the cost of capital estimates. Therefore, the valuation model is not the most important issue as long as 7 With the increasing growth of the socially responsible investment agenda, large institutional investors increasingly show a preference for firms pursuing socially responsible activities (Guenster et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Cheah et al., 2011) , and indices such as FTSE4Good are increasingly being used by investors (Galema, Plantinga and Scholtens, 2008 there are sufficient variations in the estimates among firms. Second, the PEG model has less onerous data requirements, and only requires share prices and analyst earnings forecasts. Finally, prior studies (Botosan and Plumlee, 2005; Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007) indicate that the cost of capital estimates obtained from the three alternative approaches (RIV, AEG and PEG) are fairly similar and positively correlated.
The PEG model (Easton, 2004) estimates the cost of equity capital as follows:
Where: 2 is the two-year-ahead analysts' earnings forecast for the firm; 1 is the oneyear-ahead analysts' earnings forecast for the firm; and 0 is the current share price. Both 1 and 2 must be positive and 2 must be greater than 1 (Easton, 2004; Lee, Walker and Christensen, 2006) . We obtain the share prices and analyst earnings forecasts data from Datastream's I/B/E/S. We collect analyst forecasts made after the release of the annual report to ensure that the analyst forecasts incorporate information from the annual reports (see Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005; Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007) .
Disclosure measures
The data for measuring disclosure is drawn from annual reports published between March 2004 and Financial Review (OFR) requirements, which were to become mandatory from period beginning 2005 (the decision to make the OFR mandatory was later repealed in 2006). 9 Although there are other channels through which firms report information, such as the internet and analyst meetings, the use of the annual report to measure corporate disclosure is well justified in the literature. For example, it is mandatory and widely distributed by listed firms (Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995) , and is the main channel by which firms communicate with investors and other stakeholders (Bozzolan, O'Regan and Ricceri, 2005; Guthrie, Petty and Ricceri, 2007) . Eng and Teo (2000) show that analysts do revise their earnings forecasts after the release of annual reports, whilst Hope (2003) documents a positive relationship between annual report disclosure and analysts' earnings forecasts accuracy.
We create two measures of disclosure for the analysis: IC disclosure and financial disclosure.
Our focus is on voluntary disclosure to ensure that we differentiate firms. We develop our disclosure measures as follows. For IC disclosure, we apply the checklist developed by Li, Pike and Haniffa (2008) . This comprehensive checklist comprises 61 voluntary IC items divided into human, relational and structural items (see Appendix A, Panel A). We develop the financial disclosure checklist from a review of literature (e.g., Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Botosan, 1997; Mangena and Pike, 2005) , regulatory requirements (i.e., accounting standards; listing rules) and this yielded 35 items (see Appendix A, Panel B). We then read the entire annual report to score the items on the checklist and develop a measure of disclosure. For both IC and financial information, we use a binary indicator value, assuming 1 (for yes) and 0 (for no) if an information item is disclosed or not disclosed in the annual report, respectively. In this case, the method we use captures the presence or absence of a disclosure item in the annual report. 10 We then create a disclosure index for each firm by dividing the sum of disclosures (all the 1s) by the total number of items scored (total count of all the 1s and 0s) (see also Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002 expect a 'discussion of disposals and effects on the results' in the report, and the firm would be awarded a '1' score if discussed; '0' otherwise. Where no amounts on disposals or acquisitions are included in the financial statements, we assume that the item 'discussion of disposals and effects on results' is not applicable. 11 We validate our disclosure measures in two ways. First, three independent experienced coders score 15 randomly selected annual reports. The correlation among the scores by the three coders was significantly high at 0.98. Second, following Botosan (1997) and Richardson and Welker (2001) , we regress the disclosure scores against firm size, leverage, return on assets, multiple listing, analyst following, and listing age. These variables have been shown to be associated with disclosure (Richardson and Welker, 2001; Mangena and Pike, 2005; Li, Pike and Haniffa, 2008) and if our disclosure scores are valid, they should be related to these variables. Our results are generally consistent with these previous studies. The results of these tests conservatively assure us that our disclosure measures are valid. 12 The use of proportionate stratified sampling was to ensure that we build a sample that is representative of the population, both in terms of the sectors and the size of the firms. We considered that as the number of firms in each industry group is not the same simple random sampling will not meet this objective. To ensure that our sample includes both large and small firms, we first ranked firms in each sector by market capitalisation and then systematically selected one firm from every three firms in each industry grouping.
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Descriptive statistics
In Table 2 , we present summary descriptive statistics for the sample. Panel A provides the statistics for the cost of equity capital, IC and financial disclosures and control variables, and Panel B presents the cost of equity capital and disclosure statistics by industry. The mean (median) value of the cost of equity capital ( ) is 9.95% (9.02%), which, although marginally lower, is consistent with the INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Empirical results
In this section, we present the empirical results of our study. We first report the univariate analysis in section 5.1 and then in section 5.2, we present our multiple regression results. Table 3 reports the correlations between the independent variables and dependent variable as well as among the independent variables. The table shows that the cost of equity capital is significantly and negatively related to each measure of disclosure: the ranks of IC disclosure index (RICDI) and financial disclosure index (RFDI). We also note that although the correlations among the independent variables are significant, multicollinearity is not a problem because they are below the 0.7 benchmark (Gujarati, 2003) .
Univariate analysis
13
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Multiple regression results
We first rank both IC and financial disclosure scores to alleviate the effects of extreme observations consistent with prior studies (see Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002; Francis, Khurana and Pereira, 2005; Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007) . Similarly, to reduce the impact of outliers, we winsorise the cost of equity capital data at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution (as in Lee, Walker and Christensen, 2006; Muino and Trombetta, 2009 ). 14 Section 5.2.1 presents the main results, and in section 5.2.2, we provide the results of robustness tests. 13 Additional checks included an examination of the variance inflation factors (VIFs) in our model to further test for multicollinearity. All VIFs are well below the threshold value of 10 indicating that multicollinearity does not pose a problem (Gujarati, 2003) . We also compute condition index using eigenvalues of the independent variables correlation matrix. As a rule of thumb, a condition index below 30 suggests no cause for concern and, a condition index of over 30 indicates the presence of collinearity (Gujarati, 2003) . The largest condition index is 15.8, which is well below the threshold. 14 We also run the regressions with raw disclosure measures and the cost of equity capital as in Francis, Khurana and Pereira (2005) and find that the results are similar.
IC disclosure, financial disclosure and cost of equity capital
The results of the relationship between the cost of equity capital and IC and financial disclosures are presented in Table 4 .
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
We first run the regression including the control variables only (Model 1) to establish whether our cost of equity capital estimates are related to the traditional risk factors in the predicted fashion, thus also validating the cost of equity capital measure. Overall, our results are in line with prior predictions (see Fama and French, 1992; Easton, 2004) . The coefficients of LnSIZE and BETA are significantly negative and positive, respectively, whilst the coefficients of LEV and LnB2M are both positive, but not significant 15 . These results offer us assurance that our estimates for the cost of equity capital are valid. Finally, although not significant, the coefficient of ACCOREPUT is negative in line with prior studies (e.g. Guenster et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011) .
In Model 2, we introduce RFDI only into the modelling to allow comparison of our results with previous studies that examine the effects of financial disclosure on the cost of equity capital.
Our results show that the relationship between financial disclosure and the cost of capital is negative and significant only at the 10% level or better. This is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Amir and Lev, 1996; Botosan, 1997; Richardson and Welker, 2001; Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007) . As noted earlier, prior literature (Amir and Lev, 1996; Nagar and Rajan, 2001; Pike, Rylander and Roos, 2002; Holland, 2006) suggests that IC combines with physical and financial assets to create value.
Consistent with this, we introduce RICDI into the analyses (as in Model 3). In this case we are testing 15 The insignificant results for LEV and LnB2M are consistent with other previous studies (see Richardson and Welker, 2001 whether IC disclosure and financial disclosure are individually and jointly related to the cost of equity capital, thus addressing hypothesis 1 (H 1 ) and hypothesis 2 (H 2 ). The results indicate that the coefficient of RICDI is negative and significant at the 5% level or better, supporting hypothesis 1 (H 1 ). The coefficient of RFDI is also negative and significant at the 5% level or better, thus hypothesis 2 (H 2 ) is supported. We observe that when we introduce RICDI to Model 2, the coefficient of RFDI changes from a significance of 10% level to significant at the 5% level or better (in Model 3). These results suggest that the effect of financial disclosure in reducing the cost of equity capital is magnified by the presence of IC information. This confirms that when combined with IC disclosure, financial information has better incremental effect on the cost of equity capital (Amir and Lev, 1996; Pike, Rylander and Roos, 2002; Orens, Aerts and Lybaert, 2009 ).
With regard to the notion that IC and financial assets interact to create value (e.g., Nagar and Table 5 .
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As indicated in Model 4, we find that the coefficient of RICDI is still negative and significant at the 5% level or better, but RFDI is no longer significant. The coefficient of RFDI*RICDI is positive and significant at the 5% level or better, thus our hypothesis 3 (H 3 ) is supported. This implies that the interaction between IC and financial disclosure has an incremental effect on the cost of equity capital beyond that of the individual disclosure types. The fact that RICDI remains significant whilst RFDI is not suggests that the interaction between the disclosure types is such that the relationship between financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital depends on the level of IC disclosure (see Aiken and West, 1991) . In this context, the positive interaction term implies that the impact of financial disclosure on the cost of equity capital is greater for high IC disclosure firms than for low IC disclosure firms. To gain better insights into the interaction effects of the two disclosure types, we perform further analyses in which we partition our sample into three levels of IC disclosure to create low, medium and high IC disclosure categories and re-run the analyses. This approach is similar to Cheng, Collins and Huang (2006) and Muino and Trombetta (2009) . Using the percentiles as reported in Table 2 
The results are reported in Table 5 (Models 5 and 6). In Model 5, we include RFDI, MICDI and HICDI and find that the coefficient of MICDI is negative and significant at the 5% level or better, whilst both the coefficients of FDI and HICDI are only significant at the 10% level or better. When we interact both MICDI and HICDI with RFDI (Model 6), MICDI drops to a significance of only 10% level or better, whilst RFDI and HICDI are no longer significant. With regard to the interaction term, we find that the coefficient of RFDI*MICDI is negative and significant at the 5% level or better, and RFDI*HICDI is also negative, but not significant. These results suggest that the effect of financial disclosure on the cost of equity capital is augmented for firms characterised by a medium level of intellectual capital disclosure.
Robustness checks
To enhance the robustness of our results, we perform further analyses (1) using alternative measures of the cost of equity capital, (2) testing for endogeneity, and (3) including additional control variables. These are performed for the main models only (i.e. Model 3 in Table 4 and Model 4 in Table 5 ) and demonstrate that the results still hold, suggesting that our results are robust.
Regarding the alternative measure of cost of equity capital, we use the Abnormal Earnings
Growth (AEG) model, which is derived in Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) and is specified as follows:
Where:
2 is the two-year-ahead analysts' earnings forecast for the firm; 1 is the one-year-ahead analysts' earnings forecast for the firm; 0 is the current share price; − 1 is the rate of perpetual growth in abnormal earnings beyond the forecast horizon, which is represented by the economy-wide growth (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005; Botosan and Plumlee, 2005) 16 ; and 1 is the one-year-ahead dividend per share forecast. The results are reported in Table 6 (Models 7 to 9) and the results are largely similar to those in Tables 4 and 5.   17   INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE Second, prior studies (e.g., Nikolaev and van Lent, 2005; Orens, Aerts and Lybaert, 2009) argue that a major concern in using the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression approach is that of endogeneity. In this respect, it is possible that, on the one hand, disclosure lead to a reduction in the cost of equity capital, whilst on the other hand, the cost of equity capital may influence a firm's disclosure policy. This potential endogeneity problem may affect the interpretation of the results on the relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity capital. We test for this problem by applying a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. In the first stage, we estimate the regressions of RFDI and RICDI based on exogenous variables of the cost of capital together with instrumental variables. For the instrument variables, we include analyst following, listing age, sector, return on assets and multiple listing status (Models 10 and 11). Previous studies suggest that these variables are associated with disclosure (see for example, Botosan, 1997; Richardson and Welker, 2001; Li, Pike and Haniffa, 2008; Orens, Aerts and Lybaert, 2009 ). In the second stage, we re-run the cost of capital regressions by replacing RFDI and RICDI in our original models (see Models 3 and 4 in Tables 4 and   5 respectively) with their predicted values (PREFDI and PREICDI) from the first-stage 2SLS estimations (Models 10 and 11). The results as reported in Table 7 (Models 12 and 13) remain similar to our original results. As in Model 3 (Table 4) , Model 12 results (Table 7) show that both financial and IC disclosures are negatively related to the cost of equity capital. Similarly, as in Model 4 (Table   5 ), Model 13 results indicate that IC disclosure is still negative and significant, whilst financial disclosure is not significant. Additionally, the interaction term is significant and positive. This analysis suggests that endogeneity might not significantly influence our results.
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Finally, to our original model specification in Tables 4 and 5 , we also add separately additional variables as a test of robustness (the results of these tests are not tabulated here). First, Lee, Walker and Christensen (2006) find that firms in knowledge-intensive sectors have higher equity premiums than other sectors due to greater uncertainty resulting from high growth, intense competition and shorter product life cycles. We therefore introduce, SECTOR, as an additional variable, which assumes a value of 1 if the firm is classified as in knowledge-intensive sectors and 0 otherwise. 18 Second, following Gietzmann and Ireland (2005) and Muino and Trombetta (2009) , we include long-term growth (GROWTH) as an additional variable. We obtain long-term growth forecasts from I/B/E/S. Third, prior literature (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Richardson and Welker, 2001) shows that firms with low analyst following enjoy greater cost of capital benefits from enhanced disclosure. In this context, we partition our sample into low and high analyst following using a dummy variable (ANALYST) assuming 1 if number of analysts is below the median, and 0 otherwise. In all the three analyses above, we find that our results are similar to our original analyses.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigate whether IC and financial disclosures are jointly related to the cost of equity capital. We also analyse whether IC and financial disclosures interact to affect the cost of equity capital. The cost of equity capital is estimated using the PEG model (Easton, 2004) and both IC and financial disclosures are measured using a disclosure index approach. We find that IC disclosure is negatively related to the cost of equity capital, and the relationship between financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital is magnified when combined with IC disclosure. We also document evidence indicating that IC and financial disclosures interact in their effects on the cost of equity capital. The interaction term is positive implying that for firms with greater IC disclosures, the impact of financial disclosures on the cost of capital is greater than for firms with low IC disclosures. Further analyses partitioning IC disclosure into low, medium and high indicate that the effects of financial disclosure on the cost of equity capital are augmented for firms with a medium level of IC disclosure.
These results are robust to alternative measures of the cost of equity capital, endogeneity and to the 18 The industry sectors that we classify as knowledge intensive are biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, IT, business service providers, telecommunications, banks and insurance, media and publishing, aerospace and defence, chemicals, and electronic and electrical equipment. We classify the remaining industries (real estate, mining, retailing, engineering, food and beverages and utility) as traditional sectors (see Bozzolan, O'Regan and Ricceri, 2005; Unerman, Guthrie and Striukova, 2007) . We find that IC disclosure is higher for knowledge based sector firms (at 71.7%) than for traditional sector firms (at 66.4%) and using t-tests, we find the differences are significant at the 5% level.
inclusion of additional control variables.
Our study makes important contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the limited literature on the relationship between the cost of equity capital and IC disclosure. Second, we document empirically, for the first time, that there is an interaction effect between IC and financial disclosure on the cost of equity capital. In this respect, our decision to disaggregate corporate disclosure into IC and financial disclosure provides additional insights into the disclosure-cost of capital relationship not examined in prior studies. Finally, our results have implications for policy and practice. An understanding of whether IC disclosure is associated with the firm's cost of capital provides policymakers and regulators with a basis upon which to evaluate the costs and benefits of disclosure. The results are also important to managers of firms. They suggest that enhancing IC disclosure makes financial disclosures more meaningful for investors and also benefit the firm in terms of a reduction in the cost of equity capital. In this context, firms with low IC disclosure might consider improving the extent of IC disclosures to lower their cost of equity capital.
Our findings must be interpreted in the context of at least two limitations. First, both cost of equity capital and levels of disclosure are difficult to measure. While this limitation must be noted, the reliability tests we conducted, based on similar prior studies, suggest that our results may be robust despite potential measurement errors in our main variables of interest. Second, the study uses only equity capital and not debt, so that the cost of capital used does not reflect the firm's total financing costs. A potential area of future research is to examine whether IC disclosures also affect the cost of debt financing as well. (2004) model. RICDI denotes the rank of IC disclosure index; RFDI is the rank of financial disclosure index. LnSIZE is the natural log of market capitalisation at the end of the financial year of the firm. BETA is the firm's market risk which is drawn from the Risk Measurement Service, which is a quarterly publication by the London Business School's Institute of Finance and Accounting. LEV is the financial leverage of the firm calculated as total liabilities of the firm scaled by the firm's market capitalisation at the financial year end.
LnB2M is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio of the firm computed by scaling the book value of equity by the market capitalisation at the year end. ACCOREPUT denotes the accountability reputation of the firm, measured as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is included in FTSE4GOOD index of socially responsible firms. The FTSE4GOOD index includes firms that perform well in the areas of environment, social and governance and we base our measure on the list published prior to the financial year end of the firms in our sample. LnSIZE is the natural log of market capitalisation at the end of the financial year of the firm. BETA is the firm's market risk which is drawn from the Risk Measurement Service, which is a quarterly publication by the London Business School's Institute of Finance and Accounting. LEV is the financial leverage of the firm calculated as total liabilities of the firm scaled by the firm's market capitalisation at the financial year end. LnB2M is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio of the firm computed by scaling the book value of equity by the market capitalisation at the year end. ACCOREPUT denotes the accountability reputation of the firm, measured as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is included in FTSE4GOOD index of socially responsible firms. The FTSE4GOOD index includes firms that perform well in the areas of environment, social and governance and we base our measure on the list published prior to the financial year end of the firms in our sample. RFDI and RICDI denote the ranks of financial disclosure index and IC disclosure index, respectively. LnSIZE is the natural log of market capitalisation at the end of the financial year of the firm. BETA is the firm's market risk which is drawn from the Risk Measurement Service, which is a quarterly publication by the London Business School's Institute of Finance and Accounting. LEV is the financial leverage of the firm calculated as total liabilities of the firm scaled by the firm's market capitalisation at the financial year end. LnB2M is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio of the firm computed by scaling the book value of equity by the market capitalisation at the year end. ACCOREPUT denotes the accountability reputation of the firm, measured as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is included in FTSE4Good index of socially responsible firms. The FTSE4Good index includes firms that perform well in the areas of environment, social and governance and we base our measure on the list published prior to the financial year end of the firms in our sample. RFDI and RICDI denote the ranks of financial disclosure index and IC disclosure index, respectively. RFDI*RICDI denotes the interaction term of the ranks of FDI and ICDI. MICDI denotes medium level IC disclosure measured as a dummy taking the value of 1 if 0.623<ICDI<0.787, 0 otherwise; and HICDI denotes high level IC disclosure and is measured as a dummy variable taking 1 if ICDI≥0.787, 0 otherwise. Finally, RFDI*MICDI and RFDI*HICDI are the interaction terms for financial disclosure (rank) and medium IC disclosure, and financial disclosure (rank) and high IC disclosure respectively. LnSIZE is the natural log of market capitalisation at the end of the financial year of the firm. BETA is the firm's market risk which is drawn from the Risk Measurement Service, which is a quarterly publication by the London Business School's Institute of Finance and Accounting. LEV is the financial leverage of the firm calculated as total liabilities of the firm scaled by the firm's market capitalisation at the financial year end. LnB2M is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio of the firm computed by scaling the book value of equity by the market capitalisation at the year end. ACCOREPUT denotes the accountability reputation of the firm, measured as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is included in FTSE4Good index of socially responsible firms. The FTSE4Good index includes firms that perform well in the areas of environment, social and governance and we base our measure on the list published prior to the financial year end of the firms in our sample. RFDI and RICDI denote the ranks of financial disclosure index and IC disclosure index, respectively. RFDI*RICDI is the interaction term of the ranks of FDI and ICDI. LnSIZE is the natural log of market capitalisation at the end of the financial year of the firm. BETA is the firm's market risk which is drawn from the Risk Measurement Service, which is a quarterly publication by the London Business School's Institute of Finance and Accounting. LEV is the financial leverage of the firm calculated as total liabilities of the firm scaled by the firm's market capitalisation at the financial year end. LnB2M is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio of the firm computed by scaling the book value of equity by the market capitalisation at the year end. ACCOREPUT denotes the accountability reputation of the firm, measured as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is included in FTSE4Good index of socially responsible firms. The FTSE4Good index includes firms that perform well in the areas of environment, social and governance and we base our measure on the list published prior to the financial year end of the firms in our sample. PRERFDI and PRERICDI denote the predicted values of the ranks of FDI (RFDI) and ICDI (RICDI), respectively, from the first stage 2SLS, whilst PRERFDI*PRERICDI is the interaction term for the two.
ANALYST is the number of analyst following the firm; LISTAGE is the company age measured as the number of years the firm has been listed on the stock exchange; SECTOR denotes sector classification, taking the value of 1 if the firm is classified as in the knowledge-intensive sector, and 0 otherwise; ROA the return on assets of the firm; and MULTLIST is multiple listing, measured as a dummy taking the value of 1 if the firm is listed on another stock exchange, and 0 otherwise.
